The roles of culture and creativity within urban development strategies. Outlining a theoretical framework for analysing Scandinavian cities

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Introduction

In the last few years, urban development strategies in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) have been strongly influenced by the beliefs of what makes cities desirable in an increasingly globalise economy, where knowledge, creativity and innovation are the driving forces for economic growth and prosperity. Today, many policy makers believe that for cities to prosper they must be attractive for people. This is in contrast to the former view that attracting capital and companies was the most important criterion. The situation has been reversed: an attractive “humane climate” will lead to the establishment of the knowledge industry. Vibrant cities offering an array of cultural qualities will be the most desirable places to live, consume and produce, accordingly, the most competitive in the knowledge economy. In this paper I will argue that whereas urban cultural policy-making used to be restricted to a vertically organised public arts sector, urban cultural policy-making today is moving into a new direction in order to support the competitiveness of cities in the knowledge-based economy: urban cultural policy is becoming more comprehensive, more inclusive and process-oriented, and it takes economic and spatial effects and conditions into account. This contrasts with traditional urban cultural policy where economic and spatial affects to a large extent was regarded as “external”. Furthermore, I will argue that only a few cities in Europe and Scandinavia stick to just one rationale in their urban cultural policy. In most cities there is a co-existence of several rationales. In my opinion it is indisputable that culture has become well established as a central axis of both urban economic and social development strategies. These arguments will be based on a discussion about how urban cultural policies in Europe have developed from the 1950s up until today. This will be supported by making references to the preliminary results from case-studies conducted in a couple of Scandinavian cities.

Embracing urban culture and creativity

In recent years there has been a growing interest in mobilising urban cultural resources for economic revitalisation and in making money out of culture, consumption, spectacle and urban buzz. These qualities are all assumed to be staples of the post-industrial economy (Amin, 2006) and it is strongly believed that they bring competitiveness to cities and allow them to compete in a globalise economy. This interest is evident by the vast literature on themes like “urban renaissance” and “creative cities” as well, a literature which has been important in feeding into a strong discourse about whole new potentials for the wealth of cities if urban cultural qualities get boosted: “The potential for selling culture has been grasped eagerly by urban decision makers after decades of uncertainty about how to meet the needs of an expanding urban population against a background of sustained urban deindustrialisation and loss of economic rationale. Interestingly, though, the new expectations are symptomatic of more than new
possibilities for local renewal, in that urban culture is coming to be seen as a driver of new forms of capitalism such as the knowledge or information economy, or the economy of obsessive consumption and libidinal drive” (Amin, 2006: 9).

According to Amin (2006) there are at least three manifestations in contemporary thought and policy practice where the urban is scripted as a symptom of the new:

First, large cities provide a critical mass of economic actors; a deep labour pool; firms in related industries and associated institutions; and other resources for firms to draw on in order to increase their competitive advantage (Graca Saraira, forthcoming; Porter, 2000). Contact networks; particular skills and attitudes; educational, cultural and leisure facilities; meeting places for the hyper-mobile; access to various institutions of influence like the media and political bodies, etc. have been characterised as specific cultural resources which predominantly can be accessed in the centres of major world cities. Such “urbanity is standard of fast capitalism” (Amin, 2006: 10; Sassen, 2001).

Second, artistic and creative communities are attracted and energised by the cultural buzz of this urbanity. This buzz (Storper & Venables, 2004) lubricates important relations within design-intensive and knowledge-intensive production networks. It also offers a compositional variety and redundancy that can set of innovation and new opportunity, which is required by industries and organisations that make up the knowledge economy e.g. universities, media, entertainment, businesses in the creative sector, and arts organisations (Grabher, 2004; Storper & Venables, 2004). The buzz is an economic force of the city as it meets mundane needs of scientific and technical communities, and as such the cultural assets of the urbanity are vital in sustaining the new knowledge capitalism (Amin, 2006). Policy-makers have also turned their focus on the buzz, which means that along with investments in more conventional kinds of urban culture like high and low culture, multi-cultural spaces, etc. there is an increased interest in non-mainstream groups and lifestyles (Amin, 2006). As an example the claim made by Florida (2002) of a correlation between high levels of business creativity and innovation with a high “gay index” has led to an interest by policy-makers in gay districts and how they can be supported (e.g. Toronto and Copenhagen; www.toronto.ca, www.kk.dk).

A third way that the urban cultural-economy has been conceptualised is as the space in which money is made out of selling culture in a society in love with consumption (Amin, 2006; Urry, 2002; Zukin, 1995). As will be illustrated in depth below, urban development strategies have been strongly influenced by a thinking of selling culture for consumption for at least the last two decades. In the “.. new urban boosterism, all of city life has become an opportunity for making money out of consumption and nourishing commercial activity that perpetually feeds the desire, in an art of selling places for
pleasure” (Amin, 2006: 11). The urban landscape has also been transformed in this process as the urban makeover in a paradigmatic city like Birmingham shows. Here, massive investments in prestige projects and consumption-led urban regeneration have been made as an attempt to refashion the city as a cosmopolitan hub and citadel of spectacle (Amin, 2006: 11; Loftman & Nevin, 2003 in Amin, 2006; Berg, 2003).

In a cultural-economy perspective (Amin & Thrift, 2004) these manifestations, or symptoms, adds up in a “...re-branding of the (urban) economy as a particular kind of force-field, one based on the economics of cultural mobilisation “(Gotham, 2005 in Amin, 2006: 12). However, one of the very likely consequences of this re-branding may be attention to what is high-flown and sufficiently spectacular to get the city on the “radar screen” of potential visitors and investors (Landry, 2006), but at the same time a neglect of the mundane: “… the neglect or disappearance from attention of the very many mundane activities and the various social groups and entities associated with them that characterise urban economic life, such as manufacture, retail, reproduction, repair, circulation, and welfare, as the spotlight falls on cultures of creativity, consumption and spectacle” (Amin, 2006: 12).

Pointing to tensions of this kind within urban cultural policy between e.g. the spectacular and mundane, the consumption-led and the production-led, the social inclusive arts versus the social exclusive arts, etc. has been central in a sustained critical analysis of urban cultural policies for decades (Harvey, 1989; Zukin, 1995; Skot-Hansen, 2005b). The elements which create tension and the character of tension, however, seem to change over time, and arguably will be different in space as well (e.g. in different cities). I will return to this issue of tensions later in the paper.

**Blurred boundaries between culture and economy**

An important driving force behind the increased appreciation of urban qualities is the rise of the “new economy” in which the creative ability to innovate is a crucial precondition for sustaining economic growth. The new economy, however, radically alters the way firms, cities and regions maintain competitive advantage since innovative processes have become dependent upon conditions beyond the scale of firms (Florida, 2002; Scott, 2000; Markusen, 2004). While locations in the “old economy” were selected by firms if they provided e.g. cheap labour, low taxes, or low-cost land, then urban qualities which stimulates innovative and creative individuals and milieus have become principal in the new economy, although the production cost dimension is still important of course. Today, a tolerant urban atmosphere where a diversity of lifestyles and communities coexist and are enriched by high-art, experimental and alternative art-scenes, is therefore regarded as crucial to attract the most important production factor in an innovation-drive economy, the creative and innovative labour force of the knowledge-economy (Florida, 2002).
While these urban qualities not necessarily directly feed into all innovative processes, they have become regarded as indispensable elements in the feeding-chain of creativity.

This argument of proponents of *creative cities* (e.g. Florida, 2002; Landry, 2000; 2006) does not only contrasts with classical innovation- and growth theories, but it certainly also contrasts with conventional urban cultural strategies, which for many years have been concentrating on projects related to passive consumption (Mommaas, 2004). Following this line of argument, then cities which would like to be competitive in the new economy should appreciated art and culture not only for their aesthetic values or because they contribute to the forming of identities, but in particular because they inspire processes of creativity that potentially end up in commercialised products and services. Similar observations have been made by numerous scholars e.g. Scott (2000), Evans (2001) and Amin & Thrift (2002), who argue that place, culture and economy have become symbiotic categories in the post-fordist economy: “The symbolic and political economies of culture have arguably never been so interlinked” (Evans, 2001: 2). This implies that cultural advanced cities will take strong positions in the urban hierarchies of the new economy.

This way of thinking increasingly strategic about urban cultural resources has been embraced by local decision-makers in cities all over the world. Consequently “… more than ever before, cities’ development strategies are often embedded in urban cultural policies as an integral element” (Kulonpalo, 2004: 8). In the next section of the paper, I intend to sketch out some general trends of how urban cultural policies have developed in the European countries in the last decades. This exercise should make it possible for me later on to discuss whether the strategic ways of using culture so prevalent in contemporary urban development strategies may instrumentalise cultural policy in novel ways and steer it away from its hitherto focus areas.

**Development of urban cultural policies in Europe**

While it is difficult to make generalisations about the development of cultural policies in the European countries from the post-war period and up until present time, a number of common trends can be identified, which I will refer to below.

In their examination of cultural policies in the European countries Basset (1993) and Bianchini (1993) illustrate how, in the 1950s and 1960s, culture was conceived very narrowly as “pre-electronic arts” (Bianchini 1993 in Kong, 2000) and with only modest sense about how culture could be a resource to be exploited for economic development purposes. Instead, important goals of state cultural policies in the post-war period was to distribute national, prestigious and centrally administrated common culture to groups in society who, for social and geographical reasons, had no or only poor access to culture
(Bayliss, 2004). Following Skot-Hansen (2005; 1999) a *humanistic* rationale was most evident in that period since policies aimed to democratise access to culture with an underlying goal that people would become more enlightened through access to culture (Bayliss, 2004).

In the 1970s and 1980s a wider definition of culture was adopted in cultural policies across Europe as politicians began to see cultural development as an integral part of urban policy and politics. Important goals included greater access to cultural facilities; activities for all citizens; the promotion of mean to self-expression for individuals and groups; and the promotion of community (re)building in which, importantly, the city centre was reasserted as a “… catalyst for civic identity and public sociability” (Bianchini, 1993). This broadening of cultural policies has been interpreted as related to the rise of new urban social movements which prompted politicians to give greater political and cultural autonomy to the grassroots in society.

The driving rationale of cultural policy of this period was *sociological* as policies focused on empowering marginalised groups such as children, women, homosexuals and immigrants. The value of the culture and identity of these groups could be confirmed by their active participation in for instance local amateur activities (Bayliss, 2004; Skot-Hansen, 1999). Referring to Vestheim (1994) Bayliss (2004: 6) notes that the sociological rationale in this period may be seen as the first sign of a partial instrumentalisation of cultural policy, since cultural ventures and investments began to be used as instruments to attain goals in others areas that purely cultural (see also Skot-Hansen, 2005a). As in earlier decades there was a general neglect of the economic potential of cultural resources in the European countries in the 1970s and up until the mid-1980s (Kong, 2000; Skot-Hansen, 2005b; Bianchini, 1993).

Since the mid-1980s, however, experiences from mainly British cities highlighted the potential contribution of cultural policy to urban economic and physical regeneration. This partly replaced the emphasis on community development, participation, and revitalisation of public social life which had grown strong in the discourse of cultural policies in the 1970s. The British experience initiated a noticeable shift to an instrumental use of culture for purposes related to urban development issues as cities throughout Europe confronted collapse of their industrial base (Basset, 1993). Attention also turned to cultural industries (such as printing, music and broadcasting) which generated both direct employment and income. These kinds of industries often served to revitalise parts of the city as they typically were located within marginalised districts on the fringe of city centres, where cheap rents and redundant buildings served as useful conditions for work studios, spaces for rehearsals, exhibitions, etc. (Bayliss, 2004). Planning and establishment of cultural quarters/districts complete with a production and consumption
infrastructure and ancillary promotional bodies became the next obvious step to take in urban cultural policies. Local decision makers realised that cities could derive multiple gains from cultural economic policies as growth of jobs in the cultural industries sector could stimulate other industries as well (Kong, 2000).

These strategies, however, were not always successful in terms of creating wealth and employment since many of the jobs in the cultural sector were (are) likely to be low-paid, non-standard and often precarious service jobs (Bianchini, 1993). This included the occupation for many artists who could be pushed out of parts of the city due to the increasing rents that gentrification often lead to. Paradoxically, their movement could threaten the cultural attraction of city centres (Zukin, 1995: 284). Alternatively, the potential of culture in terms of creating indirect effects were discovered as culture increasingly gained an important role within place promotion strategies that sought to reconstruct city images (Bayliss, 2004). This became increasingly important as global tourism including cultural tourism expanded, but re-imagining cities as places of consumption of high-profile cultural events such as prestigious arts festivals and other flagship venues such as concert halls, were also believed to attract investments, inhabitants and labour (Bianchini, 1993). It was also recognised that qualified personnel expected a certain supply of interesting educational, cultural and recreational opportunities for themselves and their families when choosing residential locations (Dziembowska-Kowalska & Funck in Bayliss, 2004). The significant value of culture in relation to the image of a city underscored the growing importance of image consciousness in the modern economy in which image became a currency in and of itself (Kong, 2000: 5). This demand for cultural capital of the new “service class” was explained as a pursuit of prestige (Urry in Bayliss, 2004), which is somewhat similar to the observation made by Harvey (1990), who argue that for the urban elite consumption of high arts and culture is a form of economic and class distinction. As the consumption model increased in popularity along with intensified inter-urban competition, many cities copied attractions and buildings that had proven successful elsewhere rather than adopting a unique strategy tailored to their local context (Bayliss, 2004).

Numerous cost-benefit studies criticised the consumption strategies that were highly influential in cultural policies throughout Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s for not having enough positive economic impact: although job creation took place jobs were fragile and did not help much in replacing jobs lost in the industrial sector; and flagship projects were costly and required a substantial and often entirely public sector funding and revenue support (Bayliss, 2004). It also became evident that only a limited number of cities could achieve success as major cultural centres. Still, it was widely recognised that although cultural facilities and resources of cities did not determine entirely a city’s appeal to investors compared to traditional location factors like educational and skills.
level or the tax level, culture was an “… increasingly important complementary factor in
the competition between cities possessing similar advantages” (Bianchini, 1993: 18).

As a consequence of the changing motivations and rationales in urban cultural policies
towards consumption-led rationales, potential tensions were detected between “old and
new, social and economic, community and elite-oriented policies” (Bianchini, 1993: 3).
Critical academics in the 1980s and 1990s highlighted numerous of these tensions of
consumption-led urban cultural strategies: One tension was between strategies that
supported elite flagship projects in order to enhance urban competitiveness, and
decentralised, community-based provision of more popular cultural activities, targeted
particularly low income and marginalised groups (Kong, 2000). Another was
incompatibility between social and economic policies which could cause conflict between
“…city centre and periphery … tourists and residents, economic development and quality
of life goals” (Parkinson & Bianchini in Bayliss, 2004: 8). Gentrification caused by an
improved image due to the cultural sector could displace indigenous communities and
businesses (Zukin, 1995). There was also a potential conflict between the use of cultural
policy as a strategy emphasising growth and property development, and the need to
protect and develop indigenous local identities (Bianchini, 1993). A preference for “safe”
art and big names that could attract commercial sponsors and large audiences had the
power to marginalise local and regional cultures and identities (Bayliss, 2004). In a
radical critique Harvey (1989) accused cultural economic policies for being a “carnival
mask” because they allowed politicians to conceal growing social inequality, polarisation
and conflict within cities, and he continued: “Concentration on spectacle and image rather
than on the substance of economic and social problems can also prove deterious in the
long-run, even though political benefit can all to easily be had” (Harvey, 1989: 16).

The emphasis of an economic and consumption-led rationale over the social and political
role of cultural policies has been explained in the literature as caused by a change in at
least two kinds of socio-structural conditions: first, changes in cultural consumption and
social class lead to a general increase in consumption of cultural products and services.
Related to this was a decline in working time and an increase in the proportion of
disposable income spent on leisure activities (Basset, 1993; Bianchini, 1993: 1); second,
the shift from a fordist to a post-fordist regime of accumulation (Amin, 1994; Harvey,
1989) and the associated need for economic and physical restructuring of cities prompted
governments to re-examine cultural policies and mine the potential role of cultures for
economic gain in order for the city to face the growing competition in the new post-
industrial service economy (Kong, 2000). Under these changing conditions urban cultural
policies became important to construct images of post-fordist consumption-oriented cities
with a high quality of life, especially for the globally mobile and attractive skilled
personnel of the new economy (Basset, 1993; Bianchini, 1993). As a result, cities
constantly had to position themselves in relation to the other cities in terms of urban qualities. In that sense, culture more and more became the business of cities (Zukin, 1995), and as pointed out by Kong (2000: 6), cultural policy since the 1980s became a response to the globalisation of capital.

According to Bayliss (2004: 8), however, a narrow economic instrumentalism seems to have been given less priority in urban cultural policies since the late 1990s, partly due to a growing disillusionment with the regressive sociocultural impacts of culture-led economic development mentioned above. Instead, there has been a renewed concern for social impacts of e.g. training and participation community-based cultural activities, and spread of a new language of social capital, community capacity and holistic approaches (Griffiths in Bayliss, 2004; Landry, 2000; Bianchini, 1993). This turn has corresponded with a rehabilitated general interest for social aspects of urban regeneration and a dismissal of economic boosterism, property-led initiatives and place marketing as they have often failed to deliver the anticipated social and economic benefits (Bayliss, 2004: 8). Skot-Hansen assert (2005; 1999) that this turn indicates more attention to previous rationales of cultural policies like empowerment and enlightenment instead of the preoccupation with economic impact rationales of event-making, entertainment and enlivenment which was predominant in most years of the 1990s. Correspondingly, Bayliss (2004) sees this turn as indicating a new social instrumentalism within cultural policy which matches a new discourse of urban policy (Bayliss, 2004).

The social turn in cultural development has been evident in the UK where it has been supported by the central government since the late 1990s. Benefits from this policy, which mainly builds on local and participatory cultural activities, were argued to include greater opportunities for socialisation and contact across different sections of the population encouraging greater understanding between groups, and in that way contributing to increased social cohesion. The belief is that community empowerment can be strengthened through e.g. participatory arts activities, which can reposition both the external and internal identity of places (Bayliss, 2004). Another attraction of such cultural activities is that they are relatively cheap; they can be set up quickly and flexibly in response to local needs and ideas, and they offer potentially high returns at a very low risk. Managerial, administrative and organisational skills of community institutions and voluntary skills may also be strengthened as they take part in the process of planning and implementation of cultural activities (Landry, 2000; Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 1999 in Bayliss, 2004).

Multi-rationality of contemporary urban cultural policies
Above, the argument has been put forward that in recent decades urban cultural policies in the European countries have followed certain motivations and rationales. While the
attachment to only one rationale seems to have been the case in the 1950s and 1960s (the humanistic rationale), in the decades that followed cities rarely attached to only one rationale. Instead, a co-existence of several rationales has been the norm, especially in the most recent decade. Today, urban cultural policies often contain goals that can be explained by humanistic rationales, like promoting fine arts and access to them; and a sociological rationale where community is in focus and where marginalised social groups are endowed with an independent voice; as well as an economic rationale manifest in support for the cultural industries or cultural flagship-events of which an important aim is to reconstruct and highlight a new image of a city.

In what follows, attention turns to three approaches which are very much used in contemporary urban cultural policy and planning: cultural planning, the talent-strategy, and cultural cluster strategies. I will argue that within all of these strategies there is a co-existence of several rationalities simultaneously as they are all aiming at contributing to the development of cultural (artistic), economic and social issues, although with different methodologies.

**Cultural planning**

The cultural planning approach is symptomatic for the social turn identified in the urban cultural policy of the late 1990s. In this approach the aim is to obtain a wide integration of art and cultural expression as well as cultural resources in revitalising cities and city-life (Landry, 2006; 2000; Bianchini, 1993). Based on an anthropological concept of culture as “a way of life”, cultural resources in this approach includes all those aspects that contributes to “the making of a place”: tangible and intangible qualities like the arts; cultural heritage; local festivals; local rituals; youth culture; ethnic minorities and communities; local products; local crafts and competencies; public spaces; architecture; image, etc. Cities that wish to follow this strategy should put culture at the centre of its development strategies in order to use it as a dimension in all aspects of urban development (Bianchini, 1993). Furthermore, cultural planning builds strongly on an appreciation of indigenous recourses, entailing a belief that all places can do better if they mobilise their intrinsic but perhaps undetected cultural resources: “Every place has more assets than first meets the eye, hidden in the undergrowth, invisible, unacknowledged or under-acknowledged” (Landry, 2006: 272). As such cultural planning contrasts a narrow and sectoral conception of cultural policy which sees culture as high-culture and the fine arts. Instead, cultural planning is a holistic and interdisciplinary approach. Ghilardi suggests (2004) that this approach descents from the radical planning approach advocated by Jane Jacobs in the 1960s. Here, the city was conceptualised as an ecosystem consisting of physical-economical-ethical processes interrelating with each other in a natural flow, which was difficult for urban planners to understand because of their “sectoral thinking” (Jacobs in Ghilardi, 2004).
Furthermore, characteristic for the cultural planning approach is its explicit focus on space and place (e.g. on a part of the city or the entire city). Importantly, cultural planning is about strengthening cultural pluralism by increasing ways of expression for all segments in society. As such it can be regarded as a democratic approach to cultural policy (Skot-Hansen, 2005b), but it is also a strategic tool for development: “Cultural planning is the strategic and integral use of cultural resources of community development” (Mercer, 2002: 172). In the UK the cultural planning has become highly instrumental in terms of contributing to economic and social development simultaneously.

This approach, however, has been criticized on several grounds including that the anthropological approach to cultural policy applied becomes very broad and makes it difficult to comply with narrower planning and prioritisation of arts and culture (for an elaborated critique, see Stevenson, 2004). In a state of pure cultivation cultural planning may bring the death to cultural policy, because it seems very difficult to combine on the one hand social and economic “needs of a city”, and on the other hand support for the arts and the cultural life (Skot-Hansen, 2005b). Furthermore, the effect of such cultural policies (e.g. investment in community arts) compared to other areas of public and social policy in terms of combating social exclusion, has been much debated. The main point of criticism in connection to this issue is that such cultural policies, which target the nexus of the economic, social and cultural spheres, do not remove the structural conditions that cause social deprivation and exclusion, like structural power-relations (Merli in Bayliss, 2004). A similar critique of structural blindness can be put forward against the talent-model (below).

**The talent model**

In policy and business circles “the talent model” (also known as the theory of the “creative class”) offered by Florida (2002) has proved highly influential as a prescript for cities and city-regions to confront some of the challenges posed by the “new economy”. The central argument put forward by Florida is that the highly mobile skilled worker of the knowledge-economy is attracted to places that offer certain employment opportunities and “quality-of-life” amenities and lifestyle options. This covers elements like good public transport, fine public schools, universities, parks and places for jogging and cycling, culture and the arts, like music and theatre. His notions of culture and the arts, however, challenges conventional thinking: while much explicit public funding in the area of culture traditionally has been directed towards “capital-C” culture and arts institutions like museums, galleries, symphony music, operas, theatres, etc. Florida has an expanded notion on how culture attracts talent (Graca Saraira, forthcoming). He draws
attention to two aspects of the culture of and in cities which are influential on the economic competitiveness in the new economy:

The first is cultural vibrancy, which is defined as the whole cluster of amenities mainly revolving around a vibrant street level culture – from outdoor cafés and hip restaurants to local level art galleries and a pulsating music scene. While many of these qualities develop naturally, spontaneously and symbiotically, and clearly cannot be manufactured entirely through public policy, one of the policy options available to create the best growing conditions for these qualities is urban planning for the use of city space which follows the lines of new urbanism (Landry, 2006; Florida & Gates in Graca Saraira, forthcoming).

The second dimension of culture is tolerance and diversity, which he measures by a “gay index” and a “foreign-born index” (as mentioned above he finds a correlation between high levels of business creativity and innovation with a high “gay index”). Winning cities, according to Florida, are cities with a tolerant urban atmosphere in which a diversity of lifestyles and communities coexist and are enriched by high-art, experimental and alternative art-scenes. These urban qualities are regarded as crucial in order to attract the most important production factor in an innovation-drive economy, the creative knowledge-worker (Florida, 2002).

These urban qualities, however, do not necessarily feed directly into innovative processes taking place in business or in research laboratories, but they have become regarded as indispensable elements in the feeding-chain of creativity because they are qualities in the urban environment which attracts the creative class and talents. This argument not only contrasts with classical innovation- and growth theories, it certainly also contrasts with conventional urban cultural strategies that for many years not have had their eyes open on the value of street-level culture, but have been concentrating on projects related to passive consumption (Mommaas, 2004). Florida points to relations between culture, lifestyle and urban economies that goes against a hard-core instrumentalisation of culture e.g. as it takes out with mainstream strategies like investments in cultural flagships and specialisation (Skot-Hansen, 2000b).

Florida’s ideas have travelled the world and have been adopted without too much change in development direction in an endless amount of urban development strategies, perhaps because instead of being revolutionary his ideas are in fact very modest (Peck, 2005: 19). Typically what an operationalisation of his ideas would call for is “… that communities focus their energies on events, cultural activities and leveraging public and private funds to revitalize historic districts through the construction of lofts and bike paths, but most
importantly, make sure they foster a “quality-of-place” environment to young people” (Florida, 2002: 294).

Critics have pointed out that much of the practical work in this area conflates the notion of quality-of-life, which is an individualized concept, with quality-of-place which suggests a consensus among people. This assumption of consensus tends to favour certain economic development strategies over others, and it de-politicizes the concept and makes it harder for more marginalized voices to be heard in the quality of life debates (Graca Saraira, forthcoming). As Jamie Peck, one of the hard “Florida-bashers” suggests, the real ethos of the creative age is about “…nurturing and rewarding [a very narrow definition] of creativity” (Peck in Graca Saraira, forthcoming: 12).

This criticism goes along with a body of recent literature which points to a contradiction between urban entrepreneurialism on the one hand and social justice on the other which is evident in increased social polarisation in fast growing cities (Harvey, 1989; Fainstein, 2001). Referring to the unprecedented proliferation in the construction of high-arts cultural institutions throughout the US in the 1970s Harvey (1992) argues that this took place due to structural changes in the global economy, which accentuated the desire of urban elites to increase symbolic capital in their city. For the urban elite, the consumption of high arts and culture is a form of economic and class distinction as well (Harvey, 1990). Others have argued that the increase of government funding received by these cultural institutions was made possible because like-minded individuals in business, the arts and government engaged in creating an image of the city as a place of global cultural sophistication in which museums and opera houses play an important role (Strom, 2002). Peck (2005) argues that the same group of decision-makers use Florida-like creativity arguments to again justify government investments in their version of culture and the arts over other more socially democratic cultural institutions like libraries, parks and recreation (Graca Saraira, forthcoming).

Another critique put forward is that the talent-model takes it as natural thing, that what seems to be beneficial for the talents and the creative class is good for everybody. It is blind to the fact that the lifestyle of the creative class may very well undermine the needs of other groups. As an example, when a certain area in a city becomes hip in the eyes of creative consumers, it may push out (creative) artists who stay there for relatively cheap rents. This was observed already by Zukin in her study of gentrification in Soho: “People with economic and political power have the greatest opportunity to shape public culture by controlling the building of the city’s public space in stone and concrete. Yet public space is inherently democratic. The question of who can occupy public space, and so define an image of the city, is open ended” (Zukin in Skot-Hansen, 2005b). Although there is space for negotiation, the analysis made by Zukin (1995) suggests that public
space since the 1970s increasingly has been defined on macro-level in the sense that
culture has become an instrument of city governments and their associated corporate
partners (Skot-Hansen, 2005b).

Taking Castells (1994) as a point of departure, the positive notion of diversity in the
talent-model can be discussed as well. Castells points to some of the conflicts arising
from the informational or dual city which “…leads to the fundamental urban dualism of
our time. It opposes cosmopolitanism of the elite, living in a daily connection to the
whole world (functionally, socially, culturally) to the tribalism of local communities,
retrenched in their spaces that they try to control as their last strand against the macro-
forces that shape their lives out of their reach. The fundamental dividing line in our cities
is the inclusion of the cosmopolitans in the making of the new history while excluding the
locals from the control of the global city to which ultimately their neighbourhoods
belong” (Castells, 1994: 30; Skot-Hansen, 2005b). By this Castells points to a potential
risk of social destabilisation because of the diversity of socially mutually excluded groups
that can be found within the city or parts of the city. This contrasts with Florida’s positive
view of diversity, including ethnical diversity, which he sees as a precondition for urban
development. Latent conflicts due to diversity are out of focus in the talent model, as
argued by Skot-Hansen (2005b). Consequently, proposals about how to tackle these
conflicts are out of focus. A very likely outcome of the talent model then is the city as a
multicultural theme-park where diversity appears through consumption of exotic cultural
products (Harvey, 1989). As Skot-Hansen (2005b: 8) points out, “… immigrant cultural
works should have the option to have multiple identities at the same time, and not just
being reduced to being an immigrant cultural worker contributing to the kind of diversity
wished by cultural policy”. A challenge is how to find ways to build frames for inter-
culturalism: “We need to move one step further towards inter-culturalism which builds
bridges, helps foster cohesion and conciliation and produces something new from the
multi-cultural patchwork of our cities. In this way local culture and ingenuity is reshaped.
Creativity may be encouraged by fragmentation, but certainly not by marginalisation”
(Landry in Skot-Hansen, 2005b).

**Cultural cluster strategies**

Whereas urban cultural policy-making used to be restricted to a vertically organised
public arts sector, today urban cultural policy-making has gone into a new direction since
it has to be more comprehensive, it has to be more inclusive, process-oriented and take
economic and spatial effects and conditions into account. Economic and spatial affects
was to a large extent regarded as “external” to conventional urban cultural policy-making.
In contrast to cultural flagship-projects and the spectacular festivals and events that have
been mainstream-instruments as a way to promote cities with culture, then *cultural
clustering strategies* according to Mommaas (2004) represent the “next stage” for how
culture and the arts can be used as resources for urban regeneration since it implies a “…
shift from a policy aimed at organising occasions for spectacular consumption, to a more
fine-tuned policy, also aimed at creating spaces, quarters and milieus for cultural
production and creativity” (Mommaas, 2004: 508). The creation and nourishment of
cultural clusters, where mixtures of cultural functions and activities are grouped together
in a great variety of spatial forms, from production to presentation and consumption and
from theatre and the visual arts to pop music and the new media, has increasingly been
taken up as a new, alternative source for urban cultural development (Mommaas, 2004).

Cultural clusters appear with a great variety of backgrounds and formats from stand-alone
buildings or larger complexes, to entire quarters or networks of locations in a city
(Mommaas, 2004). Quite often, but not always, a former industrial complex is an
important building block for the cluster where a great variety of leisure and entertainment
from bars, restaurants, cultural retail, art cinemas, and even sports facilities like a
climbing wall also are located. In that way they often are shaped as entire
“experiencescapes” (O’Dell & Billing, 2005).

They may have started as left over places taken over by squatters or informal groups of
cultural producers who turn the place into an alternative cultural site. Other cultural
clusters has been born by the drawings of an architect or a planner with the intention to
revitalise urban quarters and to strengthen the local creative economy, whereas again
other clusters are been nourished because private investors knows how important a
cultural vibe in an area might be for attracting a certain segment of consumers and new
inhabitants. Some of the most well-known examples from Europe of cultural clusters
include The Custard Factory in Birmingham, The Temple Bar in Dublin and The Cable
Factory in Helsinki.

According to Mommaas (2004) cultural cluster strategies represents a new urban cultural
policy which includes a vertical perspective based on notions of artistic progress and the
refined are being complemented and in many cases also replaced by a more transverse
and developmental perspective (Mommaas, 2004: 508). Consequently new actors with
new interest are crowding the urban cultural policy-subsystem (Sabatier, 2006) like
economic development agencies, urban planners and private investors. The collaborative
and developmental approach and the new agendas for urban cultural policy-making that
is being introduced along with this approach, however, has also raised debate and
uncertainty about the motives and rationales of urban cultural policy. This anxiety is
perhaps most predominant within established (high) cultural milieus. What is feared is an
expulsion of the “real” artistic and cultural values due to a hyper-instrumentalisation
(Ellis, 2003) of the arts and culture implying an exploitation of “… culture for the sake
of a recentralised “landscape of consumption” catering for new middle-class consumers
…and] to what extent is the stress on cultural entrepreneurship, underlying most of these
projects, just a cover-up for a diminishing public support for the arts, in the end handling over artistic talent to the global creative industries, tourism and the culture of entertainment and the spectacle?” (Mommaas, 2004: 509).

The new approach to urban cultural policy-making also represent the blurring of former antagonistic dynamics between culture and the economy and the development of a new and more complex interaction between the two spheres. Furthermore, it may be a sign indicating new relations between public policy and civil society in which public-private organisations in various hybrid forms have become just as important as the state in defining what cultural policy means (Looseley, 1999 in Mommaas, 2004).

The roles of culture and creativity within urban development strategies. Notes from Scandinavia
With the turn towards a post-fordist knowledge based economy driven by creativity and innovation the landscape of urban cultural policy in Scandinavian countries has changed in more or less the same way as in their fellow European countries (see above). Generally, urban cultural policy has gained an increased role in economy and policy considerations, on national, regional and especially at city-level (De Paoli, 2005). In various central policy-documents by the national governments the importance of urban qualities including a rich cultural life has been promoted more intensively lately. Urban qualities and the consumption of urban culture, entertainment and experiences are believed to be of growing interest generally in society. As attractants for the highly demanded labour force of the advanced sections of the knowledge economy the importance of these qualities have been stressed by the governments as well (e.g. the Danish National Report, 2005 and the Swedish “Storstadsutredning” in 1990). In that way the importance of the cultural buzz found in the largest cities (Storper & Venables, 2004) has also been recognised by policy-makers. The predominance of major investments in public cultural facilities in the capital of Copenhagen by the Danish government in recent years can be interpreted as being partly an outcome of this policy.

As in countries throughout all over the world, the influence of the talent-model on national and local policy discourses has been massive, and has been adopted in policy-documents at all levels in the three countries (Danish Ministry of Culture & Danish Ministry of Business and Economics, 2003). It is remarkable that cities of all size have adopted the talent-model in the policies: With reference to the Norwegian context De Paoli (2005) observes that it is mainly politicians and policy makers in less populated regions and towns such as Kristiansand, Namsos, Skien and Porsgrunn that have embraced the talent-model and used it as a prescript for urban planning with the intention to attract the creative class.
The *cultural planning approach* has been promoted explicitly by the Norwegian government lately. All Norwegian cities were targets of the promotion campaign launched in 2004, although peripheral Norwegian cities were specially targeted as cultural planning was seen as a way to mobilise “hidden” resources in even the most remote city, and in that way it could be helpful in supporting regional development. Characteristic for the campaign, however, was that a focus of the campaign was to mobilise local resources that potentially could be commercialised, enrich city life, or both. As promoted by the Norwegian government the aim was less about using cultural planning as a mean to combat social exclusion. In Denmark, the cultural planning approach has not explicitly been promoted by the government, although various projects targeted selected urban areas (e.g. the Kvarterloft-projects) in the late 1990s in many ways had a holistic approach and was based on the philosophy of mobilising indigenous, cultural resources. Since 2005, a network of cities in the Copenhagen region in Denmark has formed a network with the purpose of working with and promoting explicitly cultural planning methodology. The efforts of this network have gained much interest among other Danish cities. A project like Bazar2 in Odense that aimed at promoting ethnic business and at the same time regenerating a former industrial area is another example of explicit use of this approach which has gained noticeable attention, especially from other large cities in Denmark. As in Norway, the main focus of the Danish version of urban cultural planning has so far concentrated on identifying and mobilising “hidden” resources of all kind to be commercialised or to contribute to the “liveability of place”, and less to combat social exclusion or to promote social inclusion. In Sweden the cultural planning approach has been explicitly used to combat social exclusion in the largest cities since the mid 1990s. Malmø, the third largest Swedish city launched a comprehensive urban development program in 2004 (Velfærdsprogrammet) which explicitly follows a cultural planning approach. Lately, the cultural planning approach has been adopted by smaller cities as well (e.g. the city of Lund).

There are numerous examples of the pursuit of *cultural cluster strategies* in Scandinavian cities over the last decade. The status of this strategy, however, has grown substantially in recent years along with the growth of cultural industries as an economic sector on the one side, and as the importance of culture as a driver for a liveable urban environment attractive for the creative class has been recognised on the other side. Cultural clusters are being promoted in various formats, with various public attentions, and with various forces driving the projects. Quite often the establishment of cultural clusters/districts is being promoted as a flagship for the city. As an example this is the case of the cultural cluster currently being promoted in the harbour area of the fourth largest Danish city of Aalborg. This cluster is going to comprise a Dream house (an incubator for cultural industries), the House of Music (a new high-class House of Music) and Nordkraft (a cultural factory housing various cultural institutions). As is very typical with projects of
this size the project became highly debated in local media in 2006 after it was revealed that the cost of the House of Music would be significantly higher than what was first approved by the politicians. In late 2006 the entire project was almost dropped. Eventually, local decision-makers approved a new budget, however, implying a less ambitious House of Music. In Trondheim (the fourth largest city of Norway), a different kind of cultural cluster is being promoted. Here, the basis of the cultural cluster is an alternative squatter cultural milieu in the area of Svartlamon close to the industrial harbour. The squatters occupied a handful of small, wooden houses in the mid 1990s and their presence in the area has been approved unofficially by the city government until recently. Recently, the city government became aware of the creative environment present in this area. In 2006 it was decided by the city government that the area should develop into a cultural cluster, taking the present qualities like small cultural industries, studios, artist networks, etc. as the starting point. This decision has been approved and applauded by the squatters who see this as a way of being legitimised and a possibility of staying in the area. Simultaneously, the city of Trondheim is biding for the Winter Olympics 2018, and in that way the city is following a traditional attention-seeking strategy aiming at putting the city of the world map as well.

These cases indicate that city governments are guided by multiple rationales in their cultural policies. The case of Trondheim shows that the city government is guided by several rationales at the same time: a humanistic, sociological and economic rationale are present in the Svartlamon-project where one of the central aims is to provide conditions for the squatters to develop the Svartlamon-area based on their own resources, although with the “compromise” that the cultural industries in the area feeds into the innovative and creative milieu in Trondheim, and in that way become of value for the entire city. The biding for the Olympics indicates that an economistic rationale certainly is present as well in the cultural policy of the city. The same is the case in Odense, where the Bazar2-project follows a humanistic and sociological rationale at the same time. Simultaneously, the city government decided in 2006 to spend approx. 120 mio. Euro over the next 10 years on regenerating the central city by erecting a number of cultural flagships of bricks and mortar. This indicates that a economic rationale certainly is guiding the cultural policy of the city as well.

**Summing up - and further studies**

Only a few cities stick to just one rationale and one approach in their urban cultural policy. In many cities (and regions and countries) throughout Europe there is a co-existence of more than just one instrumental rationale in their cultural policies. The simultaneous existence of a humanistic rationale promoting fine arts and access to them; a sociological rationale where community is in focus and where marginalised social groups are endowed with an independent voice; and an economic rationales where
economic as well as urban growth is in focus, is probably the general rule instead of the exception. In my opinion it is indisputable that culture has been firmly established as a factor supporting economic growth, area regeneration, and in the re-imagining of cities. Consequently culture has now been established as a central axis of both economic and social development strategies (Bayliss, 2004: 10).

Further studies of urban cultural policies in Scandinavian cities will include a more fine-tuned analysis of policy-making and the potential conflict of various rationales (humanistic, sociological, economic, etc). An important intention of my future studies is to provide “.. a more detailed understanding of the complex exchange of cultural and economic values [which] opens up opportunities for better informed model of urban cultural governance, able to develop new intersections of cultural and economic policies, facilitating the attraction and (re)production of local cultural capital in the midst of an expanding global cultural economy” (Mommaas, 2004: 510). This analysis will take into account the contextual situation that local policy-actors navigate in, including the influence of regional as well as national cultural, business and planning policies. The arguments and rationales used by various local policy-makers and other relevant actors in the cultural field to support and justify or to counteract urban cultural development policies will have to be disentangled, partly by using discourse-analysis. In connection to this special attention will be given to the mix of cultural, social, economic and spatial justifications that are being put forward, and the reasons why. In particular, the relations between new cultural cluster strategies and relevant national and regional policies (cultural, business development and urban planning) as well as structural transformations in the global/local cultural industries, the changing composition of cities and new patterns of consumption will be explored.

References


